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 use subLegal commensuration is a complexmechanismof valuation. It entails
social exchanges amongparties in the litigational context. Theway the
law evaluates the unevaluable is guided by many speciﬁc facts about
the parties and is inﬂuenced by its own institutional priorities. The
criminal reconciliation process in China is used as a real-world empir-
ical illustration. Drawing mainly on data collected from ﬁeldwork in-
vestigation of two basic-level courts, this article identiﬁes two factors
that affect the process and outcome of legal commensuration: institu-
tional interests promoting reconciliation and the cultural meanings of
money. Political considerations play a decisive role in incentivizing
judges to facilitate reconciliation. But the cultural meanings of money
also shape judicial outcomes. In particular, blood money is valued
both for its certainty and its symbolic value as a token of apology.
Through a brief comparison of the Chinese and U.S. courts, the arti-
cle shows that our emphasis on process can generate a more socially
grounded understanding of legal commensuration.INTRODUCTION
Recent studies have identiﬁed commensuration as a key mechanism that
deﬁnes and generates values in things that are otherwise discrete anduthors would like to thank IsaacMartin andYang Su for comments on earlier ver-
f the article. Xin He presented an earlier version of the article at the University of
7 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.1
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationunique (e.g., Cohen 1984; Porter 1995; Espeland and Stevens 1998; Levin
and Espeland 2002; Espeland and Vannebo 2007; Karpik 2010; Fourcade
2011). Simply put, commensuration is the process of turning qualities into
quantities or the process of transforming “different qualities into a common
metric” (Espeland and Stevens 1998, p. 314). Its sweeping power comes
from its ability to transpose different entities into numerical equivalents,
creating a structure for comparing uncertain and unique qualities. In every-
day life, commensuration takes different guises, from accountancy (the cal-
culation of a company or a person’s “net worth”; see Carruthers and Espe-
land 1991), to cost-beneﬁt analysis (for a comparative historical overview,
see Porter [1995]; see also Espeland and Vannebo [2007]), to census track-
ing (the creation of categories such as “Hispanics,” “unemployed”; see An-
derson 1990), to ranking (U.S. News and World Report college rankings,
Michelin Guide’s ﬁve-star ranking; see Espeland and Sauder 2007); these
exercises share a logic of analysis that at root presupposes that different
phenomena are comparable and measurable.
The law ranks among the most fascinating institutions for studying how
“invaluable” and “priceless” things are compensated for and thereby mon-
etized. Legal commensuration, arguably the most prevalent form of institu-
tionalized commensuration, has systematically monetized what would oth-
erwise be known as “singular” life experiences of different kinds (Zelizer
1979, 1985). It allows for an economistic coordination of qualitatively differ-
ent feelings and emotions: money is adopted as the purportedly uniﬁed me-
dium for the calculation of lives lost and damaged, the pain and suffering
caused by injury, and the grief experienced by the loss of loved ones.
Legal commensuration is marked by the broad range it covers in pulling
different qualities together for comparison. The long arm of the law takes
commensuration to newer frontiers to price the priceless (Ackerman and
Heinzerling 2004), valuating things as varied as a healthy environment (An-
derson and Leal [1991] 2001; Ackerman and Heinzerling 2002), carbon
emissions (Levin and Espeland 2002), oil spills (Fourcade 2011), and chil-
dren’s health (Lutter 2000).
Yet, despite the adoption of a language that seems elaborated and precise,
legal commensuration remains at root a varied exercise. As some legal schol-
ars vividly suggest, the law “has ﬂip-ﬂopped like a captured mackerel, withBritish Columbia Law School (April 2015) and thanks the participants for their com-
ments. The research reported here was supported by the National Science Foundation
(grant no. 1252067). Xin He acknowledges a grant from the Research Grants Council
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (project no. CityU 11403114).
Special thanks to the Chinese judges who helped arrange our ﬁeldwork investigations
and those who kindly accepted our interviews. We are also grateful for the comments
of the AJS reviewers. Direct correspondence toKwaiHangNg,Department of Sociology,
University of California, San Diego California 92093. E-mail: kwng@ucsd.edu
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Allabout as much coherence” (Bell and O’Connell 1997, p. 43). Victims and
their dependents are compensated dissimilarly in similar cases. From a ju-
risprudential perspective, such variability is often attributed to the different
types of damages that the law allows. Economic damages provide commen-
suration for “pecuniary losses” such as medical costs and lost salaries that
can be calculated relatively straightforwardly. But noneconomic damages
provide commensuration for other intangible things—loss of companion-
ship, sexual consortium, emotional support, among others. And punitive
damages implicitly legitimize the commensuration of outrage (Sunstein, Kah-
neman, and Schkade 2000).2 Posner and Sunstein (2005, p. 539) identify the
expansive scope of legal commensuration that makes it complex: it makes
damages a function of lost income, it uses case-speciﬁc numbers to assess
damages, it focuses on the pain and suffering felt by the deceased (in case
of death), and it takes into consideration the economic and emotional loss
to dependents. The lawworks to achieve many things at once—compensat-
ing victims, sanctioning wrongdoers, and upholding its own moral legiti-
macy. So understood, legal commensuration monetizes feelings and experi-
ences that are difﬁcult, and perhaps inappropriate, to check out like items at
the cash register.3
This paper takes a different tack to explaining the variability of legal
commensuration by turning to the process of legal commensuration. Why
is legal commensuration complex and inevitably varied? Our argument is
that it has much to do with the relational nature of the monetary exchange
between parties in litigation. To look into such relational quality, we study
the practice of legal commensuration. Legal commensuration is complex
not just because many different intangible feelings and experiences are con-
verted into money. This is the legal explanation. In practice, legal commen-
suration is varied and complex because it is an act of sociation between theIn civil law countries such as Germany, damages are strictly limited to reparation and
ompensation (German Civil Code [Buergerliches Gesetzbuch, 1900]). American tort law
llows money to be used for both compensatory and punitive purposes, blurring the line
etween civil damages and criminal punishment. For that reason, punitive damages are
pposed by some legal commentators, fearing that the award of “outrage” damages un-
ermines the rationality of American tort law. Worries of unpredictability have fueled
ecurrent calls for even more rules and control mechanisms (Sunstein et al. 2000). But
r others, punitive damages remain a powerful legal expression of moral indignation
idmar and Wolfe 2009).
This tendency to provide commensuration is certainly not without its critics. Richard
bel, writing from the perspective of critical legal studies, remarks, “Damages commod-
y a unique experience, injury, by substituting the universal equivalent, money, as when
plaintiff’s attorney asks the jury to assign a monetary value to each second of the vic-
m’s pain and then aggregate it over a lifetime of suffering” (Abel 1990, p. 804). He adds,
Damages for pain and suffering extrapolate Bentham’s hedonic calculus to its logically
bsurd conclusion, insisting that every pain suffered can be offset by an equivalent plea-
ure, which can be bought for money” (p. 803).2
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationparty who pays and the party who receives. It is a practice that turns on the
material interests and cultural values of litigants and judges as well as on
the institutional context under which disparate experiences are evaluated.
The relational character of legal commensuration is illustrated by an em-
pirical examination of criminal reconciliation in China. Ofﬁcially known as
criminal reconciliation, or刑事和解 (xing shi he jie) in Chinese, the practice
allows some defendants to substitute money for jail time. Its use deﬁes the
popular perception of the system as a draconian and repressive one that still
relies on stiff punishment to achieve deterrence. On the surface, criminal
reconciliation is a highly “transactional” process that epitomizes the role
of money as a form of cure-all compensation. China has adopted, largely
by borrowing from the laws governing civil litigations in the United States
and Europe, a body of technical rules to provide commensuration for losses
and damages of different qualities into a common metric. A young person’s
life lost in the urban,more developed part of the country is valued at around
400,000 yuan today. The price would be 200,000 yuan if the same life were
lost in the less economically developed inland part of China. The effect of
criminal reconciliation is that it uses money to offset what is supposedly
“just” punishment. As a critic points out bluntly, “If you have money, you
will get a lenient sentence; if you are poor, you will go to prison” (Li 2006,
p. 96). Of course, offering money to compensate crimes is neither a new
nor a uniquely Chinese phenomenon. In The Philosophy of Money, Georg
Simmel famously discusses the utilitarian nature of wergild, or man pay-
ment, in Anglo-Saxon England ([1907] 1990, pp. 355–9). But the practice
is so prevalent that it has become an integral part of the Chinese criminal
justice system. The practice ﬁts well with China party-state’s new policy
of宽严相济(kuan yan xiang ji), or “balancing leniency and severity,” to tem-
per the widespread use of harsh punishment (Trevaskes 2009, 2010). In
2012, the Chinese government decided to “recognize” it during its latest re-
vision of the Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 2012). The new law stipulates
that “criminal reconciliation” can be carried out in public prosecution cases.4
As will be shown, the process of criminal reconciliation by no means en-
tails a simple application of legal rules. We identify two sets of factors cru-4 Chinese scholars have commented extensively on this practice, with focuses primarily
on the legal and policy repercussions of the practice. Many of them investigate the extent
to which criminal reconciliation is practiced at different levels of China’s court system
(Ge 2008; Song 2008, 2011; Sun 2011; Chen 2011; Sha 2012). Studies on the practice writ-
ten in English are also beginning to appear. Among the very ﬁrst was Trevaskes (2009),
who looked at the practice and policy behind it, particularly in relation to the procura-
torate’s new leniency agenda. Other more recent studies that examine the practice include
Zheng (2012), Mok andWong (2013), Xiang (2013), andRosenzweig et al. (2012).Many of
these studies analyze criminal reconciliation from a legalistic perspective and the legisla-
tive development with regard to this practice. Their discussions consider the legal theories
justifying this form of reconciliatory procedure in the criminal justice system.
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Allcial for understanding the process and outcome of commensuration: the in-
stitutional priorities guiding judges’ decisions and the cultural norms gov-
erning the relationship between economic compensation and justice. Study-
ing reconciliation in China allows us to examine moments under which the
search for commensuration reveals judges’ subjectivity and social skills.
Chinese judges are well aware of their designated priority tomaintain social
stability. In fact, they are almost entirely transparent about the social rea-
sons justifying their discretionary use of power. Howmoney is moralistically
valued in the Chinese social and cultural context means that litigants’ sub-
jectivity also plays an important part in the process of reconciliation. Some
victims agree to take money as atonement from offenders; others do not.
The variety of responses reveals how the complex processes of criminal rec-
onciliation must also take litigants’ subjectivity into consideration.
The speciﬁcs about the institutional and cultural concerns embedded in
theChinese case of criminal reconciliationmay be unique to China, but they
underline the relational quality that connects parties through monetary ex-
change, a quality that distinguishes legal commensuration from other forms
of commensuration. In the ﬁnal part of this article, we brieﬂy compare our
studied case of China with the practice of criminal reconciliation in the
United States to see howmoney is valued and used in a different institutional
context.MONEY COMMENSURATION IN LAW
It is no exaggeration to say that the classical sociological critique of money
comes from a somewhat one-sided reading of Simmel. Money, as men-
tioned, is considered “the most terrible destroyer of form.” Simmel writes
in The Philosophy of Money, “The more the life of society becomes domi-
nated by monetary relationships, the more the relativistic character of exis-
tence ﬁnds its expression in conscious life” ([1907] 1990, p. 512). Since value
ﬁnds a representation in money, which is only expressed quantitatively, so
the argument goes, money serves as the common metric that homogenizes
qualities into quantities. What is overlooked is that, for Simmel, money is
also a form of sociation in itself, and as such, constituted by social relations.
In a move that echoes Durkheim’s argument about individualism as a new
form of solidarity ([1898] 2013), Simmel suggests that the use of money re-
quires “social-psychological quasi-religious faith” ([1907] 1990, p. 245). For
this reason money, for Simmel, is also a social institution (Ingham 2004,
pp. 63–66). Recent works in the sociology of money literature further ques-
tion the accuracy of treating money as a neutral, universal medium for eco-
nomic exchanges. Zelizer (1979, 1985, 1994) shows that people actually dif-
ferentiate money according to type and social setting. Other studies show
that the value ofmoney varies across social contexts and social transactions.1108
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal CommensurationFor example, immoral practices such as crime, theft, and corruption pro-
duce “dirty” or “bitter”money (Shipton 1989). In Islamic societies,money gen-
erated from riba or interest on loans is sinful because it violates the Koran’s
prohibition on usury. Zelizer (1994, pp. 36–70) documents a variety of do-
mestic earmarking practices that commonly occurred in American house-
holds and shows how these were articulated in conjunction with evolving
gender roles and policy imperatives. Heath and Soll (1996) show how con-
sumers undertake mental budgeting that labels the different types and
sources of money that come into and ﬂow out of their households (cf. Thaler
1999). Gerriets (1985) ﬁnds that money in Christian Ireland was more val-
ued because it helped fulﬁll social obligations and elevated one’s social sta-
tus. Different interpretations of money are by no means limited to personal
and household practices. Both private and public organizations earmark
their internal and external budgets to meet their needs and obligations
(Stinchcombe 2001).
All of these examples suggest that the differences in types of money come
from the fact that varied social meanings are attached to the sources and re-
cipients of money. In practice, there are alternative evaluation modes that
often conﬂict and compete with the abstract mechanism of evaluation to
which the market economy subscribes. People and institutions categorize
and distinguish money. These monetary practices reﬂect a variety of social,
psychological, political, and organizational imperatives. As a result, the
commensurability of money is complicated by social and organizational
considerations (Carruthers 2010).
The tension between money as a medium of quantiﬁcation and as an ex-
pression of symbolic qualities is particularly visible in legal commensura-
tion. On the one hand, money is the “currency” offered to rationally make
up a person’s utility that is harmed by someone else’s wrongdoing. Yet
the meaning of money is deeply affected by the circumstances under which
it is offered. Despite the purported “impersonal” nature of money, the ques-
tions of who pays and who gets to be paid loom large in legal commensura-
tion. Legal scholar TomBaker (2001), in his study of the practices of collect-
ing tort compensation in the United States, refers to “blood money,” or
money offered by offenders from their own pockets, as a type of money
fraught withmoralmeanings. Baker distinguishes it from insurancemoney.
As Baker (2001, p. 276) puts it, “[blood money] hurts defendants in a way
that money paid on behalf of a defendant by a liability insurance company
cannot.” The concept of blood money suggests that claims about what is or
is not commensurable are as much about the loss that is compared to money
as about the social character of the money. The social source of money
makes a difference even in a formal legal process. Not all money can buy
love and sympathy, but some money can, under some circumstances. Be-
yond its practical valence, there is a clearmoral valence that the term “blood1109
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Allmoney” tries to capture. The social history about how and by whommoney
is raised is integral to the consideration, at least from the victims’ perspec-
tive, of whether money can be accepted as a fair compensation.
Only a few sociolegal studies have explained how law valuates in prac-
tice. Zelizer (1985), based on her analysis of published law reports, traces
the shifting cultural norms that have pushed the law to provide commensu-
ration for the emotional and sentimental value of children lost through
wrongful death. In explaining the difference in the practice of monetizing
death between tort laws and administrative regulations, Posner and Sun-
stein (2005) cite different considerations of the two institutional regimes:
the former emphasizes compensation, while the latter stresses deterrence.
Based on her comparative study of oil spills litigation, Fourcade (2011) out-
lines a theory of valuation to explain how French and U.S. laws assign dif-
ferent economic values to nature. Numerous factors are at play, but it is the
cultural and institutional acceptability of money that most fundamentally
shapes the scope of economic valuation in a given society.
Yet while scholars refer to the social nature of legal commensuration in
some of the existing works, they tend to ignore the process that brings com-
mensuration into being. Questions regarding the practices of legal and so-
cial institutions in facilitating commensuration are overlooked or deﬂected
in these accounts. While scholars see law as a social product, they still take
the ﬁxity of legal rules and categories too much for granted. As a result, the
literature is quite silent on the question of how different parties ( judges,
lawyers, litigants) use the law at times to compete, at times to cooperate,
and at times to achieve commensuration.
This article studies the situated judgments that generate legal commen-
suration. We take serious the idea that law is practiced. We explore how
commensurability is constructed by the actors involved in the legal process.
Litigants and judges see legal rules not so much as rigid rules andmandates
but as a symbolic resource to contest, to negotiate, and to relate with one
another (Edelman et al. 1992; Stryker 1990).
Speciﬁcally, we see legal commensuration as an institutionalized form of
sociation. As such, it is a process that is deeply inﬂuenced by institutional
interests of the court and the broader cultural values of a society. How val-
uation is done in the legal setting in practice is as much determined by the
values and interests of disputants as by the motivations and resources of
judges. Through studying the dynamics of the decision-making process
and the interactions between litigation parties and courts, we bring institu-
tional and cultural logics to bear on the theoretical conception of legal com-
mensuration.
Institutional constraints inform the priorities and concerns of judges in
allowing the use of money in exchange for punitive sanctions. The institu-
tional concern of judges, be it the delivery of justice and the offering of1110
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationmake-whole compensation in liberal democratic societies, or central policy
implementation and the maintenance of social stability in authoritarian re-
gimes, inevitably looms large in the decision-making process (Posner 2008).
Throughout the process, the law is used as a ﬂuid set of guidelines for judges
to sanction litigants’ requests for offering or receiving compensation.
Cultural beliefs and values also play a crucial role in the process. Cultural
perception of the use of money deﬁnes the legitimate scope of commensu-
ration. It deﬁnes the circumstances under which money is considered an
acceptable ersatz. As we will show with our empirical case of China, the
commensuration process takes into account social “intangibles” such as de-
fendants’ life circumstances, the apologetic quality of the money offered,
and the effort invested in raising the money. Furthermore, judges, litigants,
and their lawyers are involved in constructing ideas of fairness that reso-
nate with broader cultural values and norms.STUDYING CRIMINAL RECONCILIATION IN TWO CHINESE COURTS
The study is based on an ethnographic study of criminal reconciliation at
two basic-level courts: Court X in China’s northwestern hinterland and
Court Y in the southern coastal region.
The county inwhichCourtX is located has been economically left behind
since the economic reform that began in the 1980s. The regional economy
grew during the initial stage of the reform period but has stagnated since
the 1990s: by 2012, the GDP per capita had reached only around 5,200 yuan
(National Bureau of Statistics in China 2013). Agriculture has been the pil-
lar industry because of the fertile valleys formed by the Yellow River and a
climate congenial to the growing of wheat. The policy separating income
and expenses, in Chinese 收支两条线 (shou zhi liang tiao xian), one of the
most important policies affecting the ﬁnancial relationship between the
courts and local government, has never been enforced in the case of Court X.5
The cash-strapped local government offers limited ﬁnancial support to the
court. As a result, the operating expenses of the court come largely and di-
rectly from the litigation fees and ﬁnes that it imposes on criminal defen-
dants.
In contrast, the county in which Court Y is located has a population of
about half a million. It was, for a long time, the agricultural hinterland of
nearby urbanized and more economically developed cities. Rice cultivation
and aquaculture (breeding of freshwater ﬁsh, shellﬁsh, mussels, and clams)
remain themain activities of its strong agricultural industry. But the county
itself has also undergone urbanization and industrialization. Its investment-5 For an evolution of this policy, which has had huge impacts on judicial behaviors, see
Zhu (2011).
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Allfriendly economic policy has attracted foreign and domestic companies to
set up factories there. Youngmigrantworkers have streamed into the county,
seeking employment in the county’s booming industrial complexes and in the
local construction companies that are building many of these new manufac-
turing and assembling facilities. The meeting of the locals and the migrants,
their rural versus urban background, and their differences in life experiences
have brought a steady increase in social tensions and clashes. The booming
economy in coastal China also means that Court Y received more generous
subsidies for its daily operation from the local government than its rural
counterpart did. Balancing the budget is less of a concern for the administra-
tors of the court.
As part of our larger study of the Chinese legal system, one of us visited
Court X twice, in 2011 and 2012. Each visit lasted for about a month. We
conducted extensive interviews with ﬁve judges in the criminal courts. We
focused on the process of criminal reconciliation and discussed individual
cases with the judges (see below).
We ﬁrst visited Court Y in 2012 for a month to establish a relationship
with the judges working there. One year later, we returned to spend another
month with the same group of judges. We asked for and were granted per-
mission to sit in on the criminal courts. We surveyed the docket and picked
out cases that we believed were most likely to involve criminal reconcilia-
tion. We attended about 30 trials, of which about a third mentioned recon-
ciliation as an option that both sides agreed to pursue. It was clear to us,
however, that reconciliation often began before the trial and continued af-
terwards.
To obtain an in-depth look into the process of criminal reconciliation, we
conducted lengthy interviews with four to ﬁve judges in each of the two
courts that have experiences with criminal reconciliation in Courts X and
Y. We also interviewed the president of Court Y to get the perspective of
an administrator. The interviews averaged 60–90 minutes in length. Some
lasted more than two hours. Wemade an effort to talk to some of the judges
multiple times. We started an interview by asking judges to describe the
criminal reconciliation process to us. We then moved to deeper questions
such as some of the successful and failed cases they had presided over as
well as the stories behind the compensation offered in those cases. We paid
special attention to the understandings that different defendants and vic-
tims brought to the idea of economic compensation and the incentives of
the judges in coordinating it.
The interviews provide us a rich source of qualitative data on criminal
reconciliation as a cultural and political practice. We also obtained from
Court Y a full list of written judgments from cases that involved the use
of criminal reconciliation in 2012. These written opinions are invaluable
for studying the effects of monetary compensation on sentencing in China.1112
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that were reconciled and the social and demographic characteristics of the
defendants who offered monetary compensation to plaintiffs. Overall, the
analysis of written judgments shows us how courts react to defendants’ ef-
forts to offer compensation to plaintiffs.6
There are some practices shared by Court X and Court Y in carrying out
criminal reconciliation. We use data and materials from both courts to pre-
sent our analysis. There is, however, an important distinction in their atti-
tude towards criminal ﬁnes. Comparing Courts X and Y brings out the dif-
ferences in the reactions of well-off and poor courts to the offering of
criminal ﬁnes.WHY IS IT COMMON TO COLLECT BLOOD MONEY?
Although not ofﬁcially recognized until recently, reconciliation has perme-
ated China’s criminal justice system since the early 1990s. Through private
negotiations among parties, offenders can have their sentences reduced or
even suspended, by offering economic compensation to their victims in ex-
change for forgiveness. In some regions, almost half of the minor injury cases
ﬁled at the police ofﬁce were reconciled and thereby dropped (Ge 2008,
p. 340; cf. Huang 2013), and about a third of the criminal cases in courts
were reconciled (Cheng 2012). By most scholarly accounts, minor physical
assaults and trafﬁc-related crimes are the twomain types of crimes in which
criminal reconciliation is practiced. Reconciliation, however, is also used in
cases of fraud, theft, and crimes related to “disruption of public order.”
Criminal reconciliation is used more selectively and restrictively in cases
of violent crime such as murder, where there might be bargaining for life
imprisonment rather than the death penalty.
As the term “criminal reconciliation” suggests, the victim and the defen-
dant come together in order to reconcile, often with the court or the proc-
uratorate as mediator. From the defendant’s perspective, the purpose of
reconciling is to obtain forgiveness from the victim or the family, which is
now a formally recognized mitigation factor under the newCriminal Proce-
dure Law. For the victim, reconciliation is an opportunity to obtain ﬁnan-
cial compensation from the defendant. In an important sense, the transac-
tion of reconciliation resembles a formal contract. The hallmark of this
Chinese-style reconciliation is direct payment from the defendant’s pocket
to the victim’s. As mentioned, this is a form of blood money. The process of
reconciliation of course must receive the blessing of the court, as the power6 We triangulate our ﬁndings with judges working in the criminal courts of provinces and
cities including Jiangsu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Beijing, and Tianjin.
Our discussions also incorporate what we learned from judges outside of Court X and
Court Y.
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Allof sentencing is in the judge’s hands. If the defendant agrees to pay and the
victim agrees to forgive, then the judge will execute “the contract” by sen-
tencing the defendant leniently or in many cases, suspending the sentence.
Table 1 depicts the total number of defendants who arrived at a criminal
reconciliation agreement with their victims in Court Y in 2012. In total, 116
defendants reconciled with their victims, accounting for about 20% of all
criminal cases decided by Court Y in that year.7 Broadly, we categorize
the reconciled cases into four categories—minor violent crimes, trafﬁc-related
crimes, property crimes, and public order crimes.
Minor violent crimesmake up the largest category among cases that were
reconciled that year. Of the 46 defendants within this category, 42were con-
victed of “intentionally inﬂicting bodily harm upon another,” the Chinese
equivalent of battery in its criminal law.
The second most common type of case in Court Y is trafﬁc-related crime.
As in the United States, death and serious injury claims are more likely to
prompt a demand for money in China, even in the absence of obvious inten-
tional wrongdoing (Baker 2001, p. 299). Yet, while there is a general reluc-
tance to collect blood money in the United States and the act is considered
an exception rather than the norm, collecting blood money is a common
practice in China. Why is there no stigma attached to it?
The answer lies in the unique legal circumstances under which blood
money is collected in China. Unlike in the United States where insurance
money is generally available in tort litigations, insurance money is still rel-
atively rare or offered at rates much lower than the rates that the courts in
China would use to calculate damages.
Take trafﬁc-related crime cases as an example. The laws require licensed
motor vehicle drivers to buy “transportation insurance.” A policy that meets
the legal minimum requirement pays up to around 130,000 yuan (about
$21,300) to a victim injured or killed. In China, this amount is not enough
to cover the full “value” of a lost life in accordance with legal rules and reg-
ulations (which ranges from 200,000 to 500,000 yuan, depending on the local
economy) and the expenses of prolonged medical care and lost income due to
injury. The disparity is even larger when there is more than one victim.
More important perhaps is the fact that any discussion of insurancemoney
is often moot. A substantial majority of trafﬁc-related crime cases involve
motorcycles or electrical bicycles. Many of these vehicles are unregistered
and the drivers uninsured and often unlicensed. In the county where Court Y
is, the government has banned motorcycles within the city. Yet, as any vis-
itors to the county and to many other cities could attest, motorcycles zig-We do not have statistics from Court X, but judging from what we learned from indi-
idual judges, the two most common types of reconciled cases in Court X were minor vi-
lent crime and trafﬁc-related crime.7
v
o1114
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationzagging between cars and sometimes pedestrians are a daily sight. Rapid
economic development means that most cities lack the infrastructure and
high-capacity public transport system to cope with fast-growing trafﬁc de-
mand. In this situation, motorcycles are a cheap, convenient, but risky
means of transportation for low-income laborers. Local governments often
turn a blind eye to these unregistered motorcycles.
Furthermore, enforcement of judgments is a chronic problem in China.
In theory, victims can obtain compensation through a collateral civil pro-
ceeding to criminal procedure. They may even receive judgments that pur-
portedly instruct defendants to pay them in accordance with the compensa-
tory rules on the books. But many of these paper judgments cannot be
enforced in China’s still fragile civil litigation system (Clarke 1996; He
2009; Song 2009). One judge said, “Even those litigants without much legal
knowledge know that enforcing a civil judgment is difﬁcult. Pursuing judg-
ment money requires a lot of effort. A victim often ends up not being able to
collect the money stated in a judgment. But we will tell the victim—if you
reach an agreement with the defendant, you can get the money immedi-
ately. You don’t have to forgive if you don’t get the money.”8TABLE 1
Criminal Cases Reconciled at Court Y in 2012
Types of Crimes Speciﬁc Offences % (n) Subtotal% (n)
Violent crimes Intentionally inﬂicting bodily
harm upon another 36.2 (42) 39.7 (46)
Intentionally inﬂicting bodily
harm upon another (severe
bodily injury caused) 2.6 (3)
Rape .9 (1)
Trafﬁc-related crimes Dangerous driving 11.2 (13) 29.3 (34)
Trafﬁc crimes (death
involved) 15.5 (18)
Trafﬁc crimes (serious
injuries) 2.6 (3)
Property crimes Theft 7.8 (9) 16.3 (19)
Robbery 2.6 (3)
Forcible seizure .9 (1)
Taking advantage of ofﬁce to
illegally take possession of
property 4.3 (5)
Fraud .9 (1)
Public order crimes Causing a disturbance 12 (14) 14.7 (17)
Obstructing the administra-
tion of public order 2.6 (3)
Total 100.0 (116)8 All statements from judges a
noted.
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AllIn the United States, the demand for blood money is avoided because
there are easier targets, including liability insurance money, or in some cases,
a plaintiff’s own underinsured motorists coverage (Baker 2001, p. 293). In
China, blood money is preferred because blood money is the easier target in
the absence of a comprehensive insurance system. Blood money in this con-
text means safe money for victims and their families. For cases that have
reached the trial stage, this is the last opportunity for victims to obtain eco-
nomic compensation with certainty. When a victim’s family agrees to for-
give, the defendant or his or her family pays. In fact, a victim’s family
would not extend forgiveness unless they had received the money. The cer-
tainty of blood money is most appealing to victims and defendants. Once
both sides have agreed to reconciliation, the presiding judge will deliver
a light or a suspended sentence to reﬂect the degree of forgiveness offered
by the victim or his family. Court judgments are very precise on whether
and how much a defendant has paid. They are also speciﬁc about how
much is still owed to the victim and when the defendant will pay off the
balance. Ofﬁcial judgments therefore double as a “contractual agreement”
for the reconciled parties. For example, in the following judgment on a case
in which a tow truck driver killed a truck driver who had stopped on the
freeway to examine a ﬂat tire, the judge sets the outstanding sum to be paid
by the defendant to the victim’s family: “In the course of this trial, defen-
dant X voluntarily agreed to compensate Y (victim)’s family a total of
20,000 yuan. He has already paid 15,000 yuan to the family. He received
the forgiveness from the family of the victim.”WHY DO JUDGES FAVOR CRIMINAL RECONCILIATION?
Although there is a growing identiﬁcation with the ideology of professional
independence (Balme 2010), Chinese judges still see themselves primarily as
government bureaucrats. Courts in China do not have, to quote the famous
phrase of political scientist Davis Easton, “a reservoir of favorable attitudes
or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they
are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants”
(1965, p. 273). Judges, as ofﬁcials of a weak state bureaucracy, know that
their limited power can be more effectively used for coordinating than for
judging. From this perspective, a winner-takes-all adjudicative decision
runs the risk of challenges by the losing party. Chinese judges are eager
to dissociate themselves from situations where they have to commit to deci-
sions that may be reversed on appeal. Contrary to common perception, Chi-
na’s judicial system has become more populist (He 2009; Trevaskes 2010;
Liebman 2012). Criminal reconciliation, as part of the bigger trend of the
civilianization of criminal offenses, is an act of self-preservation. Judges1116
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationdread having their judgments appealed or petitioned. The Chinese justice
system is not value driven, as reﬂected in the minimal role of its constitution
in shaping legal development. It is policy driven. Social stability is the par-
amount policy concern of the Chinese communist regime and by extension
its justice system. As bureaucrats, judges see their primary goal as the pres-
ervation of social stability. In fact, the number of petitions and appeals
against judgments handed down by individual courts has become a crucial
indicator of courts’ job performance (Minzner 2009). Judges fear being
“done in” by persistent litigants. This fear has been exacerbated in recent
years with the party-state’s agenda of maintaining stability. Reconciliation
is appeal proof; by deﬁnition it already has gotten the agreement of the lit-
igating parties. “Honestly, we prefer reconciliation in many cases because
this gives us the best protection,” a judge admitted. From their perspective,
a done deal is as good as a closed case. “If a victim makes a petition, I’m the
one who’s responsible. If they accept to take money from the defendant, it is
the best outcome for me,” the judge added.
Besides the potential threat of petitions from disgruntled litigants, recon-
ciliation gives the judiciary some leeway to resolve the case in its own way
without defying the authority of its stronger sister bureaucracies of the police
and the procuratorate. Some judges said they were sometimes uncomforta-
ble convicting in cases that had ﬂimsy evidence provided by the police and
the prosecutor. China’s state bureaucracies coexist in a highly complex sys-
tem of interdependency and competition (Lampton 1992). Open disagree-
ment among state bureaucracies is avoided at all costs. Criminal reconcili-
ation helps judges avoid defying the recommendation of the procuratorate
by suspending sentences for defendants who reconcile with victims. A judge
we interviewed recalled the difﬁculty of adjudicating one privately initiated
criminal case (as opposed to those initiated by the procuratorate) of per-
sonal injury and property loss arising from a ﬁght between two middle-aged
women. The judge said the police provided only a brief ﬁve-page report. The
plaintiff requested 800 yuan for medical expenses for her injury and 14,000
yuan for an earring lost during a ﬁght in the defendant’s furniture shop.
The plaintiff also insisted that the defendant be sentenced to jail. According
to the defendant’s version, the plaintiff harassed her and had taken her com-
puter and two chairs from her shop. The judge was dissatisﬁed with the ev-
idence.Did the plaintiff actuallywear the earring on the day of the ﬁght?Was
the earring really lost during the ﬁght? Why did the ﬁght start? Who started
it? Howwas the injury to the plaintiff inﬂicted?While the laws stipulate that
the court may return cases to the procuratorate or the police for further in-
vestigation, gathering fresh evidence late in the trial stagewas considered im-
practical by most Chinese judges. Reconciliation was in practice the best op-
tion for the presiding judge.1117
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AllTHE ROLE OF THE JUDGES
This section examines the role of judicial ofﬁcials in the process of criminal
reconciliation. Judges are the facilitators of reconciliation. We observed
some of the judges at work in criminal trials. They were businesslike and
professional. They did not appear to be particularly warm or congenial,
but they projected qualities often found among bureaucrats: detachment,
efﬁciency, and unﬂappability. They harnessed their institutional and judi-
cial power to present scenarios for litigants that made reconciliation appear
to be the optimal, if not the only, solution. At the same time, they use the soft
power of moral suasion to inﬂuence litigants. A few cases demonstrate the
rich and sophisticated diversity of strategies used by Chinese judges. We il-
lustrate not only cases that were quickly reconciled but also hard cases that
ended without a reconciliation agreement and those that were reconciled
only after protracted and difﬁcult negotiations. Hard cases are particularly
instructive; they show that despite their knowledge and skills, judges can do
only so much to facilitate reconciliation. The defendant’s ability to pay and,
more important, the victim’s willingness to forgive are out of judges’ con-
trol. The process of legal bargaining in China has both similarities to and
differences from that in the United States. Baker states that in the United
States, “Bargaining for blood money turns more on commonsense morality
and practicality” (2001, p. 276). In China, judges play a pivotal role, some-
times in the shadow of law but other times out of the reach of law. Of course,
U.S. judges, as Baker points out, participate in the bargaining process to
facilitate settlement. For example, they may pressure institutional litigants
(such as workers’ compensation carriers) to pay more to individuals to get a
settlement. By and large, however, they play a secondary role to counsel
for plaintiffs and defendants (Baker 2001, p. 308). By comparison, Chinese
judges intervene more. Besides appealing to the law, Chinese judges often
fall back on cultural notions of remorse, repentance, or just simply good at-
titude to persuade litigants. The net result is that criminal reconciliation in
China becomes an eclectic procedure that is partly pragmatic and calculat-
ing but partly moralistic and evaluative.No Deal
It takesmoney to facilitate forgiveness. The instrumental nature of criminal
reconciliation cannot be ignored. When a defendant has no or little money
to offer to his victim, efforts to reconcile are unlikely to bear fruit. In the ab-
sence of forgiveness from the victim, a judge sometimes returns the maxi-
mum or near-maximum sentence to a convicted defendant. In Court X,
one judge recounted a case in which eight passengers on a tractor were
killed when it was hit by a tourist bus on a rainy day. The bus driver
who was found partially responsible was sentenced to seven years. Even1118
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the fact that the bus driver could not offer any money to the families of the
dead loomed large in the judge’s sentencing decision. The presiding judge
said, “I rarely gave someone the maximum sentence. But in that case, the
driver was very poor; he had a dilapidated house in a remote mountainous
area. So was the owner of the bus: the guy bought the bus just a few days
before the accident with money borrowed from his friends. The seven-year
sentence was indeed not enough. The widows and the mothers of the boys
killed were crying in my ofﬁce.”
The threat of being put behind bars gives great leverage to judges to pres-
sure defendants to participate in criminal reconciliation. Victims and their
families will not offer forgiveness without compensation. If they think a sen-
tence is too light, they may even appeal or make petitions to the court and
other government units. This is the scenario that judges and their courts
most fear.
In one case, the defendant, an unlicensed motorcyclist, struck an elderly
woman on the county’s main road on a winter morning when it was still
dark. The motorcyclist was initially knocked unconscious. When he re-
gained consciousness, the man did not move the woman from the road.
He was seen ﬂeeing the scene. The injured woman was then run over by
a bus; the bus driver was not held culpable because he had not seen her
in the dark road. The motorcyclist later explained that he had been scared
and disoriented and wanted medical treatment.
One point of contention was whether the woman’s death was caused by
the impact of the motorcycle or being crushed by the bus. Chinese criminal
law punishes someonewho ﬂees after causing injury in a trafﬁc accident but
makes a distinction between ﬂeeing and ﬂeeing causing death. If the victim
was killed by the collision with the motorcycle, the motorist would have to
be charged with ﬂeeing after an accident, which mandated imprisonment
for three to seven years. However, if the victim survived the ﬁrst accident,
then her death was caused by the motorcyclist ﬂeeing the scene and leaving
her in the road. In that case, the defendant could be charged with ﬂeeing
causing another person’s death, which would bring imprisonment of not
less than seven years (the heaviest sentence for a trafﬁc-related crime).
The prosecutor from the People’s Procuratorate asked the judge to sentence
the defendant for the crime of “ﬂeeing after causing an accident,” because the
procuratorate considered the status of the victim after the ﬁrst accident in-
conclusive. The prosecutor did not ﬁle a charge of ﬂeeing causing death.
This trial took place in Court Y during our ﬁeldwork. What would oth-
erwise have been a routine trial turned emotionally intense when the son of
the deceased asked to speak before the court. Criminal trials in China are
dominated by judges and prosecutors. Other people rarely speak. But the
victim’s son, aman in his mid-40s, delivered themost emotional speech that1119
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loudly while staring at the panel of judges and the defendant: “Can’t you
understand middle school–level Chinese? The coroner’s report clearly sug-
gests that it is this man who caused mymother’s death. I do not understand
why the law is so lenient. My mom was still alive. It was his ﬂeeing that
caused her death!”The man said the prosecutor’s recommendation ignored
the evidence presented in the coroner’s report, which, according to him, in-
dicated that the fatal spinal damage had been caused by the second acci-
dent, not the ﬁrst one.
Right after the trial hadconcluded,we talked to the son.Hewas still visibly
angry. Had the defendant offered his family any bloodmoney, would he still
have asked the judge to convict the defendant for the more serious crime?
The man replied that he still would have wanted the more serious charge.
“It has nothing to do with the money. It is about justice. I can’t understand
why they decided not to go for the more serious charge.”
We did not have access to the coroner’s report. In our interview, the pre-
siding judge said the investigation report contained an important piece of
information that the prosecutor had not mentioned. A pedestrian who had
seen the accident stated that the bus ran over the woman almost at the same
time that the man regained consciousness, implying that there had been no
time for him to get her out of the road, and therefore his running away had
no role in thewoman’s death. The judge told us that although shewould not
convict the defendant for causing death by ﬂeeing, she would not let him off
with a light sentence either. Within the sentencing range mandated by the
law, she had the leeway to sentence the defendant to as little as three years
and to as many as seven. The judge frankly admitted that she had to take
the feelings of the victim’s son into consideration. The defendant was a mi-
grant worker, and he did not offer much bloodmoney to the son. In fact, the
victim’s son was also a migrant worker; his mother had come to visit him,
and on the day of the accident she had been carrying a big basket of vege-
tables andmeat on herway back from themorningmarket to preparemeals
for her son’s family.
“Until the day of the trial, all the defendant offered was covering the fu-
neral costs of 16,000 yuan,” the judge explained. “And this was only done
after three rounds of mediation. The victim’s son was very unhappy.” She
continued, “There is an expectation that defendants in this kind of trafﬁc-
related crime would cover funeral costs. That’s the least they are supposed
to do. Often that’s still not enough, but defendants are expected to do so. A
life lost in our county, assuming that the defendant is found responsible, can
easily translate into a judgment awarding a compensation of 400,000 yuan.”
The judge shrugged off the notion that the son did not care about money.
Otherwise he would not have negotiated with the defendant in the ﬁrst
place, she said. Nonetheless, the judge acknowledged that in this type of1120
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victim’s family doesn’t change their attitude, it is likely that we’ll have to
levy a heavier punishment within the range,” she said.Deal
Judges play a crucial enabling role in cases that are reconciled. It is rare for a
victim and a defendant in a criminal case to reconcile on their own. Residual
hatred and emotions linger. As judges inCourtsX andY told us, in personal
assault cases, or in trafﬁc-related cases causing serious injury or even death,
most defendants wanted to avoid their victims. One judge explained, “Some
feel guilty to see the victim. Some fear that they’ll be yelled at or even beaten
up by the victim’s family members and friends. Some people just want to
avoid thewhole thing. To offer a personal apology to the one you hurt is eas-
ier said than done.”
From our ﬁeldwork, we noticed that presiding judges often act as go-
betweens among defendants and victims during the process of reconcilia-
tion. When asked how they promote reconciliation, the judges we inter-
viewed stressed the value of separate face-to-face meetings with both sides,
sometimes multiple times, before any discussion of a deﬁnite proposal of
reconciliation. What judges do in criminal reconciliation is not that far re-
moved from what they do in civil mediation. They broker agreements by
caucusing and meeting with the two sides separately. They hear the de-
mands of both sides. They facilitate negotiation by framing what one side
says to the other in the best possible light, usually by accentuating what
one party is willing to concede while downplaying any remaining disagree-
ments (Waye and Xiong 2011; Ng and He 2014).
Judges often present themselves as offering impartial analyses to defen-
dants and victims. Of course judges are not disinterested third parties. They
most want to avoid petition or appeal. Getting both sides to agree to recon-
cile is a sureﬁre way for judges to protect themselves. Yet they spin the
“what if” narrative as a form of objective analysis to litigants, much as
U.S. judges can when facilitating plea bargains. “We’ll tell litigant X, if
there’s no reconciliation, according to the law, I will send you to jail for x
years. We also tell litigant Y, don’t expect to get any money from the de-
fendant if he goes to jail. He’s not going to pay,” a judge in Court Y said.
Judicial ofﬁcials are also known to lecture parties on their “legal respon-
sibilities,” even though such responsibilities are in fact conventional moral
views. A case documented by Su (2000) illustrates how judges pressure both
the defendant and the victim in order to facilitate criminal reconciliation.
The case revolved around an extramarital affair. The husband H whose
wife had had an affair with another man demanded a compensation of
10,000 yuan from the other man. But the other man, his neighbor N, was1121
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ened N’s young children,1122
 use sI understand your feelings and the reasons for your excessive behavior. . . . You
have been emotionally assaulted and your reputation damaged. . . . N should
give you some compensation, but the whole discussion has gone awry. Think
it over. You can’t ask for too much or act unreasonably. In this situation,
RMB10,000 is high. Think about it carefully and remember that your wife
was also in the wrong. Now that N has brought the matter to this court,
you should not bother him anymore. If you act excessively again, the law will
punish you.Meanwhile, another judge from the same court said to N, “You shouldn’t
blame the other side. . . .You started the whole thing. It is on your shoulders
because you broke the law. You have severely affected another person’s
family and the couple’s emotional relationship, and you’ve hurt society.
You should look at your behavior from the point of view of breaking the
law, look at the results—the responsibility is yours and that makes your
illegal behavior even more serious” (Upham 2005, p. 1691; Upham’s trans-
lation).
The pressure was clearly felt by both sides. As a result, the parties settled
on 8,000 yuan. As Su (2000) points out, there was no legal basis for the pay-
ment at all. In other cases where the judge has a clear mandate of the law,
she will use it as a tool to convince litigants to agree to reconcile. In the case
in which the plaintiff insisted on both criminal and civil charges for the in-
jury suffered in the defendant’s furniture shop, the judge ﬁrst said to the de-
fendant, “This might involve up to three years of imprisonment.” A few
minutes later, when the defendant was asked to leave the courtroom, the
judge said to the plaintiff and her legal representative, “Fighting is usually
mutual. How can you claim that the responsibilities are all borne by the other
party in a ﬁght occurring in her shop? How can you prove you really wore
the earrings that day?Why did you wear such expensive earrings when you
knew your disputes might be escalated into ﬁghting? And you have taken
away a computer and two chairs.” The plaintiff, after talking privately to
her attorney, immediately proposed dropping the criminal charges and
asked for only 3,000 yuan, which the defendant quickly agreed to pay.
Once a deal is reached, the court will ask the victim’s family to write a
letter of forgiveness. In some cases, a victim only agrees to partly forgive;
that means the victim would not insist on maximum sentence and might
even agree to a light sentence but would oppose suspending the entire sen-
tence. It is common for a judge to inform the victim that “lighter sentencing”
includes the possibility of suspended sentence and see if there would be an
objection. The judge sees to it that both sides agree on the content of the rec-
onciliation agreement. The practice protects her from any future appeals orThis content downloaded from 147.008.031.043 on October 25, 2018 21:23:36 PM
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about the lesser punishment given out by the court.From No Deal to Deal
There are cases in which reconciliation at ﬁrst seemed impossible but a deal
was eventually struck after the extra efforts put in by courts. In high-proﬁle
cases with broad political repercussions, sometimes the entire judiciary will
rally to push through an agreement. These tough cases can be found through-
out the court system. The following case was recounted by a Supreme Peo-
ple’s Court judge who worked in the Death Penalty Conﬁrmation Division
during an interview we conducted for another project:All uAt the beginning, the judge was asked to persuade the victim’s family to recon-
cile (in order to get the side to agree to a suspended death sentence). When it
didn’t work, the chief judge was asked to do work. When it didn’t work, the
vice division head was asked to do work. Finally, the division head was sent
to talk to the family too. These people were all senior judicial ofﬁcials. But they
were instructed to visit the victim’s family again and again. They were some-
times humiliated by the victim’s family. The victim’s side made claims that
these judges had taken bribes because they worked so hard to facilitate a deal.
It was crazy!The Supreme People’s Court is the apex of the Chinese court hierarchy.
We heard similar stories from the frontline judgeswe interviewed inCourtX.
One judge there shared the following story. A 13-year-old girl died as a result
of medical malpractice in an unlicensed community clinic. The owner of the
clinic, a “barefoot” doctor (someonewho had receivedminimalmedical train-
ing), failed to conduct a required skin test before administering an injection.
The girl died because of an allergic reaction to the drug. No reconciliation
could be reachedduring the trial. The defendant had neither personal savings
nor property. The court sentenced the doctor to 14 years in prison and in-
structed him to pay damages of 220,000 yuan to the girl’s family. Since the
doctor had no money and was already in jail, the young girl’s family did
not receive a penny. Likemost petitioners inChina, the bereaved father’s ini-
tial efforts appeared futile. Most petitioners would have given up after a
while. But the death of his daughter turned this father into a ﬁerce and per-
sistent petitioner—the type of no-holds-barred petitioner that Chinese judges
fear most. On the eve of the ﬁrst anniversary of his daughter’s death, theman
leapt into GoldWater River, right in front of Tiananmen Square in Beijing.
His dramatic act drew the attention of senior Chinese ofﬁcials. Court X was
soon instructed to “do some work.”
The problem for Court Xwas that the judgment had already been handed
down. The defendant was in jail and had no incentive or means to pay. The1123
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Allcase needed to be reopened. And there was still the problem ofmoney, or the
lack thereof, which had led to the failure to reconcile in the original trial.
The court had an annual budget of about 300,000 yuan for special remedies.
Our judge recalled that many other desperate petitioners were also ﬁghting
for special remedies. The court eventually learned that the doctor’s mother,
who was in her late 60s, had some savings. The judge then tried everything
he could to persuade the doctor’s mother to provide some compensation. He
ﬁrst informed the intermediate-level court, the prison authority, and the
procuratorate, of the situation. He then promised that if the doctor’s mother
could pay 80,000 yuan, which was all her savings, the court would add
20,000 to make the total compensation 100,000 yuan. The case would be re-
tried, and the doctor’s imprisonment could be reduced to 10 years to take
the forgiveness of the victim’s family (if given) into account.
As soon as the doctor’s mother agreed to pay, the judge persuaded the
girl’s family to accept the offer. “Although 100,000 was less than half of
what was awarded in the original judgment, this was all the court could
do.” It took almost another year before the victim’s father agreed to the rec-
onciliation agreement. During that period, the court showered the bereaved
father with goodwill. For example, the court provided him with lunch each
time he visited the court.When the judge responsible for enforcing the judg-
ment visited the jailed doctor to ask him to persuade his mother to compen-
sate the victim’s family, he took the victim’s father with him, so that the two
men could get to know each other. The enforcement judge would drop off
theman at home after each prison visit. The girl’s father was convinced that
the court had exhausted all possible means to resolve his case. He was
touched by these efforts and by the fact that most of the money would come
from the convicted doctor’s aged mother. He agreed to end his campaign
and signed off on the reconciliation agreement that the court brokered.
Although much less than what was originally awarded, the 100,000 yuan
was valued higher than its face value. The court’s willingness to accommo-
date and the judges’ kind gestures were “added” components of the com-
pensation. It is a scenario where political constraints forced the court to
“personalize” compensation. The efforts added value to the money used
to compensate for the pain suffered by the man.BLOOD MONEY AND COMMENSURATION
We have shown the institutional interests that lead courts to facilitate the
translation of criminal offenses to cash. Another dimension of legal com-
mensuration revolves around the role of culture in shaping values in legal
compensation. Litigants, and even judges, elicit noneconomic value for a
process that is supposedly operated on a uniform matrix of money. Blood
money is valued more because of the hardship experienced by defendants1124
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fered still falls short of the nominal sum of money in a paper verdict, a vic-
tim would accept blood money as the sign of a sincere apology. Song (2009)
concludes that defendants in all successful cases of criminal reconciliation
without exceptionmade apologies to victims or their relatives. “The offering
of bloodmoneymust be performed as part of an act of sincere apology,” said
a judge in Court Y. “Just offering money is not enough. If a defendant
doesn’t show a sincere attitude, some victim’s families will reject the offer.”
The same judge went on to describe one of the cases she had heard:All uThe defendant already paid 60,000 yuan to the victim’s family [the victim was
killed]. But the victims were still very angry. As it turned out, defendant’s fam-
ily was not very apologetic. They were not most willing to pay [but they paid
anyway] and they showed it to the victim’s family. They didn’t visit the vic-
tim’s family.
So I explained to both sides and asked them to get together. I urged two sides
to put their emotions aside. I told the victim’s family that if this defendant [a
20-something young man] was sent to jail, you wouldn’t get any money from
his family. And I asked the defendant’s family if they were willing to pay more
and to apologize. They agreed. Sometimes, once that initial hurdle is overcome,
people then show a lot of emotions. I’ve seen defendants and their families kow-
tow to victim’s family to express remorse in meetings.The defendant’s family in this case eventually agreed to offer 100,000 yuan,
on top of the 60,000 yuan already paid. In return, the victim’s family agreed
to forgive. Reviewing the judgments of Court Y showed that judges often
commented on the defendants’ attitude. Thiswas especially important in as-
sault and battery cases, in which victims were often angered by the violence
inﬂicted on them. In one case where a victim was beaten up by two defen-
dants and their friends in a bar, the defendants, according to the judge, “ac-
tively sought to compensate the economic loss suffered by the victim” (they
offered a total of 35,000 yuan to the victim). The judge suspended a one-year
sentence for two defendants in return.
Cynics may say that the delivery of an apology is mere posturing and that
it is money that really matters. This view, although tempting in view of the
calculative nature of the process, is too simplistic. Moneymatters, of course.
Yet people tend to value blood money differently in view of the hardship a
defendant or his family went through in order to raise the money. In the
judgments of Court Y, some defendants were commended by the court for
trying to raise money to compensate their victims. In one case, a 22-year-
old man was accused of causing the death of his friend, a passenger on his
unregistered motorcycle. The young man was a construction worker with
very little income. In the judgment, the judge underlined the fact that his
family hadworked hard to pay the victim’s family 71,500 yuan despite their
own economic hardship.1125
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ciliation deals are worked out. In general, we can typify different kinds of
blood money by the source from which blood money is drawn as well as
the nature of the recipient.Sources
Money that comes from personal investment hurts the least, since the taking
of this type of blood money would not cripple defendants to pay for essen-
tials such as food and housing. There is now an emerging middle class in
China.Middle-class families havemoney invested in bank savings accounts
or stocks. This is why critics of criminal reconciliation describe the policy as
one that promotes inequality between rich and poor. Bloodmoney from rich
people who have savings does not hurt as much. We should point out, how-
ever, that defendants involved in trafﬁc-related crimes are more often poor
migrant workers. In Court Y, a clear majority of the litigants that we sur-
veyed did not seem to come from a middle- or upper-middle-class back-
ground. Table 2 shows a breakdownby education of the defendants in crim-
inal reconciliation in Court Y in 2012–13. Almost half of the defendants
received education only up to junior high, while another 30% received just
elementary education or no education. Using education as a proxy for de-
fendants’ socioeconomic status, the data from Court Y suggest that most
of the defendants come from a working-class background.
The second type of “blood money” is money borrowed from family mem-
bers and friends. This type of blood money hurts more than spare money
does. As mentioned, very few defendants have personal savings. In those
cases, the defendant’s entire family digs deep into their personal relationship
networks (guanxi) to help the defendant avoid prison. This puts the defen-
dant and his family in debt, both ﬁnancially and socially. Judges in Court Y
said it was common for those who have avoided jail time to take on a second1126
 use subject TABLE 2
Defendants Involved in Criminal Reconciliation at Court Y
by Education Level, 2012–13
Defendant’s Education % (n)
University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 (9)
High school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16.7 (34)
Junior high . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47.8 (97)
Elementary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29.6 (60)
Illiterate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 (3)
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 (203)This content downloaded from 147.008.031.043 on October 25,
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationjob to repay their debts. But for most defendants in China, this is still consid-
ered preferable to going to jail. As a judge explained to us,All uWith a growing economy today, most people can ﬁnd a job to make a living.
And if they work harder or get a second job, it is possible for a blue-collar worker
to make 40,000 to 50,000 yuan a year. So a worker can make 100,000 yuan in
two years [and live with his family to minimize expenses]. Of course, they have
to givemost of themoneymade to the other party. But formost Chinese families,
this is considered a much better option, because the person still has his freedom
if he’s out. The person can still stay with his family members.The third type of blood money hurts the most. It is money from home eq-
uity. Like many families in the United States, only to a greater extent, own-
ing a property is a milestone for many Chinese families. The urban home-
ownership rate is 87% in China, a level that is 30 percentage points higher
than in the United States; rural home ownership is an even higher 97%
(Troutman 2014). For defendants who own a house, using its equity as blood
money is a last resort. Precisely because it hurts so much, this type of blood
money “buys” more sympathy from the party compensated. A judge in Court Y
explained, “The other party knows that the defendant has no money left,
otherwise he (defendant) wouldn’t choose to sell his ﬂat. In some cases, the
victims’ family was willing to wait because they knew it took time to sell a
property. People usually understand.” The type that draws the most sympa-
thy from judges and opposing parties, the type of money that draws the most
blood, so to speak, is the home equity of aging parents who are forced to sell
their ﬂats to raise money for their children. The taking of this kind of money
hurts so much that even bereaved parents or children have sympathy for the
other party, at least when there are no elements ofmalice or intentional harm.
Another judge inCourtY recalled a casewhere an agedmother traveled from
a remote province to save her child:The victim was killed in the accident but the defendant had no money to com-
pensate the victim’s family. His elderly mother took the train all the way from
Hubei [a province far from County Y] alone. She presented to us about 60,000
yuan and she told the victim’s family that was all she got from selling her own
ﬂat. She lamented about her poor life and what it meant to have the son stay
with her. And even though the victim’s family was asking for more initially,
they accepted the money and said they understood and forgave. They saw
the old woman and knew it was very hard to be in the old woman’s position.
They sympathized.Here we see the social value of the bloodmoney offered by the agingmother
of the defendant as something larger than its face value. In every society cer-
tain acts convey powerful symbolic messages. In China, even today, no im-
ages aremore poignant and touching than an agingmother ﬁghting and sac-1127
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Allriﬁcing for her child. The blood nature of themoney signaled how desperate
the mother was to save her son from jail.Recipients
The other dimension of the social nexus that affects value is the social posi-
tion of the recipient.What litigantsmake of the offering of bloodmoney var-
ies. Blood money means more to poor recipients, but less to afﬂuent ones. It
is difﬁcult to strike a deal with rich victims, most of whom want to send de-
fendants to jail. They also seem to discount the value of the hardship in rais-
ing blood money. To use an economic metaphor, the marginal utility of
more (blood) money declines when victims are wealthy. Conversely, poor
victims seem to value the hardship factor more, above and beyond the fact
that they need the money. Blood money has more impact on poor recipients
in deciding whether they are willing to forgive.
When the recipients are courts rather than individuals, the impact of
blood money depends on whether or not the courts need the money to cover
their expenses. Chinese law empowers the courts to impose criminal ﬁnes
for certain types of crimes, in particular, economic crimes such as smug-
gling, commercial fraud, speculation, counterfeits, and misappropriation
of state funds (Art. 116-130 of Criminal Procedure Law). The money raised
by defendants to pay as ﬁnes to the courts can also be regarded as a type of
blood money.9 It is important to note that money paid to a court has differ-
ent social meanings from that paid by a defendant to a victim. Courts in ur-
ban developed regions of China are comparatively well ﬁnanced these days.
Criminal ﬁnes are imposed not because these courts need the money but as
an additional means of deterrence. As a result, they tend not to sentence
more leniently just because a defendant agrees to pay the ﬁne. A judge from
Court Y said he told defendantswho paid ﬁnes not to get their hopes up: “For
us, paying ﬁnes helps only in the sense the defendant shows good attitude in
admitting his crime. It is another way to show your remorse. But we are not
the victim, we can’t say: ‘We forgive.’”
Another judgeadded, “In fact, they [ﬁnes] don’tmeanmuch tous.Wedon’t
put toomuch emphasis ondefendantswhovolunteer to payﬁnes.The court is
bound by the law. For some crimes, we impose ﬁnes. For others, we don’t.”
But for courts that are short on money, mostly those in inland provinces
where the economy is less developed, the exchange between paying crimi-
nal ﬁnes and receiving less punishment is common. A judge must sentenceBy deﬁnition, criminal reconciliation refers only to the transaction between the two pri-
ate parties, thus excluding the situation in which the courts reduce the penalty for crim-
al ﬁnes. We nonetheless regard criminal ﬁnes as a form of blood money because this
clusion helps us understand the relationship between money and justice in China’s9
v
in
in
criminal justice system.
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationwithin the range speciﬁed by the law. But judges in Court X acknowledged
that they would sentence a defendant who paid a ﬁne to the lower end of the
range. Onemiddle-aged judge said in an interview, “It was back to the early
’90s whenwe found out that the criminal division could generate income. A
tribunal in our county, for half a year, collected less than 100,000 yuan in
litigation fees. But one criminal defendant was willing to pay this amount.
Whenwe came across a case like that, judges in the criminal division almost
felt like celebrating.” As documented by He (2009), cash-strapped courts in
China asked their criminal division to meet a quota in generating income.
The situation is different for courts such as Court Y, whose operational
budget is not tied to their income. We asked the same judge in Court X
about the situation of his court now.
“The district government never allocates more funds to us and we never
hand in what we collected,” the judge said. “The only difference is that back
in the 1990s, the required annual quota for the criminal division was 20,000
yuan, but now it is one million yuan.”
Other judges working in inland provinces also reported similar use of
criminal ﬁnes as subsidies for their operational budgets. A judge who was
the vice president of an intermediate court in Yunnan, a southwestern in-
land province bordering Myanmar, told us, “We differentiate defendants
in terms of the ﬁnes we charge. For a poor farmer who is caught for drug
trafﬁcking, we might ask for no more than 100,000 yuan, for this might
be all he could pay. For an ofﬁcial who is involved in economic crimes,
we will ask for one million yuan or more, especially if his lawyer takes
the initiative in approaching us.” It seems that in order to maximize their
income, these courts adopt a strategy akin to what economists describe as
price discrimination. In other words, they expect the defendants to pay ac-
cording to the best of their abilities.
We asked if judges always imposed a lighter sentence when a defendant
agreed to pay criminal ﬁnes. “Yes we do,” replied the same judge from
Court X. “The sentencing ranges for both drug-related crimes and economic
crimes are large and ﬂexible. We can reduce a 20-year sentence to 15 or
shorter. We do keep our promises.”Money Deﬂated and Inﬂated
Despite its prevalence, criminal reconciliation, more precisely, the exercise
of legal commensuration that makes reconciliation possible, remains con-
troversial. Some litigants refuse to play the game because they value other
things more. Others play the negotiation game deﬁantly in order to lose.
These litigants either price off the social value of blood money or they price
themselves out of the blood money market. In these cases, blood money op-
erates in either a deﬂated or inﬂated moral economy.1129
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AllThe value of blood money is at times deﬂated, denied, or discounted be-
cause of the value choices defendants made, the circumstances they face, or
the beliefs they hold. Some litigants simply refuse to negotiate because they
see the social purpose that blood money serves as less important, hence the
devaluation of the moral worth of blood money. They would rather go to
jail than give up their ownmoney and ask their families to help raisemoney.
Somemigrant workers, for example, afraid of losing face and not wanting to
“waste” family money, asked courts not to contact their families. A judge
said, “It’s our usual practice to ask defendants if they want to contact their
families. But some refused to tell us their family contacts. Theywere usually
migrant workers who had no local family ties. They didn’t want their fam-
ily to know. They didn’t want their family to worry about them. They are
determined not to put ‘their family through hell.’” They are, in the eyes of
judges, “hopeless” litigants for possible reconciliation because they do not
fear imprisonment and are unwilling to work with the court. Relegated to
the bottom of Chinese society (Solinger 1999), migrant workers have a spe-
ciﬁc understanding of blood money. They have a sense of responsibility to,
and often pride in, their family members. As documented, they would
choose not to visit their families during the Spring Festival, the biggest hol-
iday of the year for the Chinese, if they could not bring some money home
(He, Wang, and Su 2013). They seemed to think that if they had asked fam-
ily members to pay, they would have lost not just the money, but also face.
“They just told us, ‘Why don’t you sentence me to jail?’” said one judge in
Court Y, which deals with a signiﬁcant number of migrant workers each
year. It is interesting to note that the very value that prompts some victims’
families to take less money (because it is from the family) also in some cases
deters defendants from raising blood money for their freedom. For this
small group of defendants, it is a conscious choice of placing familial welfare
over freedom.
Other litigants think of blood money as a poor substitute for blood. In
such cases, blood money is forced to operate in a morally inﬂated moral
economy, and its face value is deeply discounted. Some wealthy victims
and their families value vindication and retribution more than monetary
compensation and thus have a reputation among judges as difﬁcult parties
to reconcile. A different judge in Court Y said, “Sometimes reconciliation is
impossible even if the defendant is willing because the victim asks for the
moon. In one case, the family of a dead victim demanded one million yuan
for compensation. Basically, the victim’s family demanded far more than
what they would have been awarded in civil litigation.” The judge added,
“With wealthy victims, they don’t really need more money. An exorbitant
demand for blood money is not a serious demand. Making an unreasonable
demand is their way of turning down reconciliation and telling a defendant
to go to jail.”1130
This content downloaded from 147.008.031.043 on October 25, 2018 21:23:36 PM
 use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal CommensurationThe families of some victims take pains to make it clear that they do not
want any compensation. They want vindication. The Supreme People’s
Court judge from the Death Penalty Conﬁrmation Division shared her story:All uYou cannot imagine the pressure we experienced. I was asked to talk to a vic-
tim’s family who lost their only son to murder. The defendant’s family hoped
their son could be spared from death penalty. The victim’s family ﬂatly said no.
But our division headwould not approve the execution decision. So Iwas asked
to negotiate with the victim’s family many times. Eventually the family got an-
noyed. Themother said, “If you judges believe one can simply reconcile in such
cases, what if I kill your son and pay you some money in return?”Blood money is inﬂated in these scenarios—it buys even less than what its
face value would have bought in normal circumstances because the other
side has raised the asking price. It is also inﬂated because victims and their
families do not take the hardship of collecting blood money into consider-
ation to offer the defendant, as it were, a “moral discount.” In cases where
victims and their families refuse to negotiate, they demand a prohibitive
price. Asking for the moon is a deﬁant way of doing what the court has
asked one to do (meaning, “I still did what you asked me to do and negoti-
ated with the other party, it’s just that the other party could not fulﬁll my
demand”).
There is also the question of whether wealthy defendants might be asked
to pay more in order to obtain forgiveness, since the money they pay in rec-
onciliation does not hurt them asmuch and is therefore symbolically inﬂated.
Our data do not offer a clear answer. As mentioned, well-educated and
wealthy defendants were a small minority in the courts we studied. Some
Chinese scholars (Xiao andWang 2010) observed that there weremore cases
in which defendants compensated above the statutory standard, although it
was unclear if this was a prevailing trend. We suspect that judges would
closely scrutinize this phenomenon of overly high compensation. Judges,
while eager to facilitate reconciliation, are wary of one party squeezing the
most money from the other party and turning the procedure into a sheer ex-
change of money for punishment. In addition, based on what we saw in the
courts we studied, it is not easy for the other party to tell if a defendant is
wealthy or not. Judges are in a better position to know, but for many reasons
(including not wanting to make the negotiation more difﬁcult than it already
is) they are not motivated to pass on the information to victims.INSTITUTIONAL AND CULTURAL LOGICS
OF LEGAL COMMENSURATION
In this study of criminal reconciliation, we show howChinese judges broker
deals with defendants and victims to pay blood money. Defendants receive
reduced sentences while victims get the compensation they would not have1131
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Allreceived in civil litigations. Judges actively negotiate these sometimes ardu-
ous deals that take into consideration the crime and the injury inﬂicted as
well as the social characteristics of defendants and plaintiffs. Along the
way, the judges spend much time urging defendants to express contrition
and offer apologies, admonishing some while empathizing with others, in
their attempts to facilitate the offer and acceptance of blood money.
Like other institutionalized forms of commensuration, valuing life and
life experiences in law is a complex exercise. Something that cannot be mea-
sured in money is “lost,” and law compensates by putting a monetary value
on that lost quality (Atiyah 1997; Cane 2013). But our study shows that
there is a unique layer of complexity in legal commensuration—its relational
quality. Legal commensuration in action is accomplished in the form of a
payment from one party to another, from the party “at fault” to the claim-
ant, or in our present Chinese case, from the convict to the victim. This
harkens back to Simmel’s idea about money that we discussed earlier—
the payment, or more precisely, monetary exchange, is a form of sociation
between the payer and the payee.10
In the case of the United States, this social quality is normally masked by
the availability of institutional money such as workers’ compensation, un-
derinsured automobile insurance, and ﬁrst- and third-party insurances.
And as a result of the prevalence of vicarious liability, a great deal of the
claims in the United States are made toward large corporations or public
authorities, who act effectively as self-insurers, on top of their role as tort-
feasors. In all these cases, the payer usually is a legal person rather than a
natural person.
The case of China, as exotic as it may sound, is arguably a more straight-
forward case for studying the social character of legal commensuration.
Criminal reconciliation arises as the insurance system in China is still very
much under development. Rather than ﬁling civil claims in conjunction
with criminal trials, defendants and victims bargain with each other under
the urging of the court. The bargaining is relatively free from the institutional
trappings that conceal its nature as a form of social exchange. As we have
shown, the meaning of blood money is constituted by what it means to the
payer and to the payee.
Unlike their U.S. counterparts, Chinese judges are primarily evaluated
by their abilities to preserve stability. They are sensitive to the potential ad-
verse impacts of appeal and petition on their appraisals, and they have very
limited institutional capital to expend on unpopular and controversial deci-Certainly, other results of commensuration, such as ranking and pricing systems, are
omplex. But their relations with the people and things ranked or priced are more indi-
ect. Challenges to these mechanisms often come in at the metalevel, such as why certain
riteria are adopted to commensurate comparisons.10
c
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationsions. They tend to be highly pragmatic (He and Ng 2013). Institutionally,
criminal reconciliation proliferates as a risk-averting option. Judges want
victims and families to accept court-brokered deals. They also push defen-
dants to reconcile. Chinese judges’ discourse of promoting criminal recon-
ciliation values social harmony over principled reasoning—“If the victim’s
family doesn’t change their attitude, it is likely that we’ll have to levy a
heavier punishment.” This way of talking appears to be normal to frame
reconciliation in China, given that maintaining social stability is considered
an essential part of judges’ ofﬁcial function. Indeed the self-evident nature,
in the judges’ eyes, of that social function comes through very powerfully in
the interview material, so much so that judges are very open about exercis-
ing their discretionary power.
The courts we studied used different tactics and strategies to persuade
victims and defendants to agree to reconciliation. The intensive all-out ef-
forts observed in some cases are impossible to carry out as an ordinarymode
of operation. As such, it is not a justice system based on rules but rather a
form of negotiated justice that is motivated by the institutional incentives
and disincentives to which judges are subjected. Judges so value the main-
tenance of social stability and avoidance of petitions that they allow some
criminals to have their jail terms shortened or suspended. Indeed, the Chi-
nese system is aggressive in the sense that the possible substitution of money
for criminal sentences is adopted as a broad policy nowadays and has be-
come an integral part of its criminal justice system. The rich, by reaching
a reconciliatory arrangement with victims, can avoid jail, at least for minor
criminal charges. Critics of criminal reconciliation are right in pointing out
that undiscriminating use of the process would lead to greater inequalities
between the rich and the poor (Li 2006; Ge 2010; Rosenzweig et al. 2012).
That said, one of the interesting aspects of the Chinese case is that the
money is clearly not just there to simply ofﬂoad responsibilities between
strangers. The exchange of money signals the building (or repair) of social
relations. Skeptics might say that our relational account of legal commensu-
ration works only in China because of the highly negotiated nature of this
process. That money is given this role in part reﬂects the weak institutional
authority of the judiciary in which judges operate. Can the same be said
about the social and relational quality of legal commensuration in the more
institutionalized legal system of the United States? Certainly, the role of
money in the criminal justice system of the United States is different. In
the judicial system of the United States, monetary or economic sanctions
are also a common means of punishment among probationers and even in-
mates (Durose and Langan 2003; Harris, Evans, and Beckett 2010). Among
different forms of economic sanctions, money paid by felony offenders to
compensate victims, or restitution money, resembles most closely the Chi-
nese case of blood money. Restitution is institutionalized through four dif-1133
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Allferent judicial programs or procedures (Ruback and Bergstrom 2006): (a) as
a component of victim/witness assistance programs, (b) through victim-
offender reconciliation programs, (c) in conjunction with probation or pa-
role supervision, and (d) through court-based employment programs. As a
more institutionalized form of “payback,” open negotiations in the Chinese
style do not seem to be prevalent. But U.S. judges are known to be reluctant
to impose restitution on offenders who are believed to be unable to pay. In
contrast, they are more likely to order restitution when the offender is better
educated and employed (Lurigio and Davis 1990).
More important for our purpose, the merits and demerits of restitution
and other forms of economic sanction are primarily considered in the con-
text of an expansive penal system in theUnited States. Economic sanction is
viewed by some as an effective alternative to reduce recidivism (Outlaw and
Ruback 1999), while others warn that the legal debts that result from eco-
nomic sanctions perpetuate the accumulation of disadvantage over the life
course of a convict (Harris et al. 2010). In other words, the institutional logic
that prompts U.S. judges to impose restitution money is different from that
identiﬁed in the Chinese case. Restitution money is neither perceived nor
used in the United States as a means to shore up litigants’ support for court
decisions. Restitution money is paid after sentencing.11 In contrast, Chinese
judges usually ask offenders to pay bloodmoney before sentencing, because
they want to secure the support of victims. The constant concern of Chinese
judges with their fragile institutional authority does not seem to loom large
as an institutional incentive for promoting criminal reconciliation in the
United States. Judges in the United States are less worried about appeals
than about their perceived independence and impartiality (Tyler 1990).
The process of reconciliation is also more depersonalized in the United
States. For example, that a defendant showed remorse or was contrite in
court certainly constitutes a commonmitigating circumstance. Yet such fac-
tors are formally considered in the context of a criminal bench trial or sen-
tencing hearing (Strang and Sherman 2003; Rachlinski, Guthrie, and Wis-
trich 2013).12 As legal scholars point out, remorse and apology “often lurk
in the interstices, appearing only as pro forma statements from defendants
to judges at sentencing” (Bibas and Bierschbach 2004, p. 92). In short, the
mechanism of commensuration is so embedded in a legal-technical dis-
course that it has sundered the social and relational quality that we identify
in theChinese case. Yetwewould argue that although payers and payees doThe collection rates of restitution in the United States are low (see National Center for
ictims of Crime 2011).
For a historical overview of the role of repentance in the criminal justice system and its
elationship to modern theories of punishment, see Wuthnow (1997).11
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationnot negotiate with each other as natural persons (parties are often not real
persons), the social and relational aspect of legal commensuration is not
erased but only routinized. As Baker’s (2001) study of tort compensation re-
veals, that relational and meaning-making aspect reemerges when, for ex-
ample, a litigant decides to game the system or when the defendant’s con-
duct is so egregious that it goes beyond the scope of a simple mistake.
The adoption of a more analytical language to talk about legal commen-
suration in the United States does not seem to have resolved the inherent
complexity of legal commensuration. The practice continues to defy stan-
dardization. Judges and scholars have been debating about principles for
justly providing commensuration for a wide range of life experiences, in-
cluding lost income, individuated damages, suffering and distress, loss of
life’s pleasure, loss of companionship, humiliation, and indignity suffered
by defendants or heirs in the case of death or serious injury (Ogus 1972;
Posner and Sunstein 2005; Cane 2013). The recent law and economics way
to value things is to look for their values in a relationship of supply and de-
mand, market value, that is. But there is no “market” for these intangi-
bles. So in order to establish market values, economics-minded judges look
for indications of how much value people put on their lives as such, what
some would call the “hedonic” value of life (Viscusi 2000; Cane 2013). They
try to get to hedonic value by looking at, for example, wage differentials be-
tween more or less risky jobs; the idea is that such differentials can work as
serviceable proxies for calculating how much people are willing to pay to
reduce the risk of death. But here this “willingness-to-pay” approach runs
into the same problem that underlies the phenomenon of bloodmoney, only
from the opposite side of the mountain—money does not mean the same
thing to everyone. Or in economic jargon, “the marginal utility of money”
varies.13
Neither does the traditional “make-whole” approach fare better. The
make-whole principle seeks to make the victim whole again by compensat-
ing for the value of the loss that has been incurred. But there is always a ﬁc-
tional quality to the claim that offering money to a victim who suffers per-
manent health impairments or even death makes the person whole again.
Monetary compensation is supposed to return a victim to the status quo ante,
but inmany cases restitutio in integrum is impossible. The event (e.g., a trafﬁc
accident) that monetary compensation seeks to rectify often diminishes the
marginal utility of money to that person. This goes back again to the question
of the varying marginal utility of money, a question that lies at the heart of
the debate over setting appropriate compensation (Viscusi 2000). From our13 To use a simple example, it is well documented that a wealthy person is more likely to
pay for his safety than a poor person (Mrozek and Taylor 2002; Viscusi and Aldy 2003).
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Allperspective, this tail-chasing recursivity merely testiﬁes to the endogenously
social quality of legal commensuration.
The eminently social character of legal commensuration can only be fully
appreciated when the meaning of blood money is interpreted through the
broader cultural logic of a society, understood as forms of discourse and un-
derstanding that become elements of the principles of exchange (DiMaggio
2001, p. 231). Here we identify visible differences between the United States
and China. Although promoted by the court, legal commensuration in China
represents a partial devolution of power to litigating parties. Litigants im-
bue the negotiation process with a moralizing logic of valuation that goes
against the quantitative calculus of commensuration. The process of recon-
ciliation makes salient stories about how defendants raised the money and
what the money meant to them. The cases we came across in China suggest
that the cultural biography of blood money matters—as the case of aging
mother who sold her house showed, the value of that blood money was
greatly increased. In the United States, the families may not behave with
such solidarity to help their members who are convicted of petty crimes.14
It seems that the Confucian “blood-is-thicker-than-water” doctrine of fa-
milial commitment makes a difference here.
In the United States, blood money facilitates one kind of reparation to a
victim—making the defendant hurt more, in a way that insurance money
cannot (Baker 2001). In contrast, blood money in China makes the defen-
dant hurt less than the alternative of imprisonment. It also facilitates repa-
ration to a victim, albeit of a different kind, through the act of apology and
forgiveness. It is therefore understood that bloodmoney does compensate in
both systems but that it provides commensuration from different moral val-
ues in China and the United States. This most fascinating “localizing” adap-
tation shows, shall we say, the cunning of culture. The bringing in of cultural
values not only disrupts the singular economistic rules that facilitate uniform
conversion but also explains the plurality of practices in different cultural
settings.Conclusions
Our study of criminal reconciliation in China unveils the complexity of le-
gal commensuration from a less familiar setting. A key to understanding its
operations, we argue, is the institutional and cultural logics embedded in
the practice. Indeed, as our brief comparison with the U.S. case shows, thisExisting studies of restitution in the United States do not list family support as a major
ctor that enhances the likelihood of payment. Instead, offenders aremore likely to pay if
ey are (a) told about the importance of restitution, (b) given employment opportunities,
) closely supervised, and (d) allowed to pay in installments (Ruback and Bergstrom14
fa
th
(c
2006, p. 252).
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal Commensurationapproach sheds light beyond the case of China. Our study also echoes
Zelizer’s (1979, 1985, 1994) and Fourcade’s (2011) works, which advocate
for the centrality of cultural meaning in shaping seemingly economically
driven practices of valuation and commensuration. Attention to institu-
tional incentives and cultural values enables sociologists to distinguish types
of institutional commensuration. For example, to attribute monetary com-
pensations to death has been a task assigned to both regulating agencies
andcourts.Butvalues are calculateddifferently by the two institutions. Pub-
licagencies tend toassignauniformprice toadeath,while courtsoftenaward
individualistic compensations (Posner and Sunstein 2005). In this case, the
difference in institutional priorities explains why commensuration varies:
public agencies focus on the ex ante effects compensations can bring, but
courts’ concern ismainly ex post. Public agencies derive their numbers from
“scientiﬁc” cost-beneﬁt analyses; judges and juries are faced with in-person
litigants whose presence in the adversarial trial makes for a more personal
encounter. Our processual focus shows that courts tend to attend to individ-
ualized facts and numbers in providing commensuration for emotions, ex-
periences, and economic losses.
At the same time, variations in commensuration within the same institu-
tion over time can be accounted for by referring to changes in the wider cul-
tural environment. As pointed out by Zelizer (1985), the price of children
who died a wrongful death has been increased from little to virtually noth-
ing in the 19th century to more than one million dollars by the end of the
20th century. This can be accounted for by the cultural change in the way
children are valued. Fourcade (2011, p. 1734) notes that the courts in the
United States have relied more on external expertise than on the common
sense of juries and judges in the search for fair compensation, and she ar-
gues that this change stems from “the culture of ‘discovery’” (emphasis
added). The explanatory power of institutional and cultural logics repre-
sents a step toward a more systematic and theoretical conception of legal
commensuration.
Our analysis of bloodmoney in China also contributes to the understand-
ing of the social meanings of money. Numerous studies have pointed out
that the social meanings of money vary with reference to its sources, its me-
dia of representation, and its recipients (Shipton 1989; Carruthers and
Espeland 1991; Zelizer 1994; Heath and Soll 1996; Thaler 1999; Stinch-
combe 2001). Our ﬁndings from China not only verify this point but also
further expand on the Simmelian point that monetary exchange is a form
of sociation. The social dynamic between the defendant and the victimmat-
ters. The value of money is sometimes deﬂated, sometimes inﬂated in rela-
tion to given social relations. Most important, it demonstrates a connection
between the different types of (blood) money and social inequality in legal
commensuration.Wealthy victims can simply ask for themoon for compen-1137
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Allsation in order to put offenders behind bars, but poor victims cannot afford
the freedom to refuse money. Meanwhile, most defendants can avoid im-
prisonment by offering their own savings or enlisting the help of their fam-
ilies. But migrant defendants who do not even want their criminal predic-
ament known to their families are literally and ﬁguratively imprisoned. In
negotiating compensation, social inequality is manifest by the disparate
evaluations that the rich and the poor bestow on bloodmoney. Our ﬁndings
thus open a new set of research questions: What is the relationship between
the disparate meanings of money and the reproduction of social inequality?
How does the situation in the United States differ from that in China? For
example, if, as Baker (2001) points out, blood money in the United States is
an expression for personal revenge, will the effect of blood money remain
the same when levied against tort litigants of lower social status and re-
sources? Law and society scholars have long suggested that resource in-
equality affects case outcome (Galanter 1974; Wheeler et al. 1987; He and
Su 2013). How will the social meanings of money, once incorporated into
the analysis, tip the scales of justice?
Finally, the signiﬁcance of political consideration in our analysis suggests
that criminal reconciliation is a phenomenon that has only become preva-
lent in this period in China. Negotiated justice stems from the limited ability
of the court to adjudicate. The weak capabilities in enforcing civil judg-
ments and a lack of social security net indicate that the state’s power and
resources are limited. To prevent petitions and protests that threaten so-
cial stability, courts are asked to pacify warring parties. As demonstrated,
judges exhausted all possible means in order to get a reconciliation agree-
ment done. Besides putting in extra efforts and time and offering tokens
of sincerity, they even put in their own blood money. As a study of the Chi-
nese criminal justice system, the role of blood money sensitizes us to take
note of the limits of the penetration of state power in China today. Tradi-
tionally, scholarship on the Chinese legal system has focused on its repres-
sive and authoritarian character (Cohen 1968, 2011; Trevaskes 2007a,
2007b; McConville et al. 2011; McConville and Pils 2013). While the state
machinery remains selectively repressive, scholarship since the mid-2000s
has begun to pay more attention to the signiﬁcant move from repression
to a more lenient regime (Liebman 2012; Trevaskes 2009, 2010). Our study
echoes this literature by revealing its weak andmalleable side: its capability
to adjudicate is rather limited as it is often forced to negotiate with private
litigants in order to get cases resolved. Our study thus paints a more com-
plicated and evolving picture of negotiated justice, in which the social
meanings of money, the political concerns of the courts, economic beneﬁts,
and sense of justice are all in play. These ﬁndings not only uncover the dy-
namics of criminal law practice but also reveal the complicated relationship
among law, politics, money, and perceptions of justice.1138
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The Institutional and Cultural Logics of Legal CommensurationFor the system to work, much, perhaps too much, discretionary power is
given to judges, creating a system that is structurally susceptible to abuse.
Judges are in a position to broker deals by applying pressure on litigants—a
power that is desirable to some litigants and one that may command its own
price. The discretionary power that Chinese judges holdmeans that corrup-
tion is a concern, particularly with judges working in the poorer inland re-
gions of the country whose salaries are known to be well below their col-
leagues working in the cities.REFERENCES
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